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MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs-ToRT LIABILITY-DUTY To PROTECT INFORM-
ERS-Decedent Schuster supplied information to the police which led to the 
arrest of the notorious Willie "The Actor" Sutton. After decedent's part in 
the arrest was widely publicized he received threats against his life. He 
demanded police protection, which was denied on a belief that the threats 
were not seriously made.1 Three weeks later the decedent was shot and 
killed by an unknown assailant. Plaintiff, administrator of decedent's es-
tate, sued the defendant city to recover damages for wrongful death. The 
supreme court dismissed the complaint,2 and the appellate division af-
firmed.3 On appeal, held, reversed, three judges dissenting.4 The complaint 
stated a cause of action based on negligence, as the city owes a special duty 
to use reasonable care to protect persons collaborating with it in the arrest 
of criminals, at least where protection is demanded. Schuster v. City of 
New York, (N.Y. 1958) 154 N.E. (2d) 534. 
Traditionally, municipal corporations have been held immune from 
suit for tortious acts or omissions connected with the performance of their 
1 The third and fourth counts of the plaintiff's complaint, alleging that the city 
falsely represented to the decedent that he was not in danger and thereby induced him 
to appear on the street where he was killed, were not discussed by the court. 
2 207 Misc. 1102, 121 N.Y.S. (2d) 735 (1953). 
3 286 App. Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S. (2d) 778 (1955), notes, 34 CHI-KENT L. REv. 164 (1956); 
44 KY. L. J. 389 (1956); 54 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1019 (1956); 58 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (1956); 1955 
SCOTS LAW TIMES 201. 
4 Judges Conway, Desmond and Froessel dissented. 
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governmental functions, unless the immunity is waived by statute.5 Since 
it has been unanimously held that the police activities of municipalities 
are governmental functions,6 the principal action would in most jurisdic-
tions have been barred by municipal immunity.7 But New York, unlike 
any other jurisdiction, has a general statutory waiver of such immunity.8 
Because of this waiver New York municipalities often may be liable for 
the tortious conduct of their police officers.9 With a fear that overall tort 
liability might place an overwhelming burden on municipal treasuries, 
however, the New York courts have sought to limit liability to areas where 
it is felt the liability can "safely" be borne.10 They have been especially re-
luctant to hold municipalities liable for nonfeasance in connection with 
governmental functions. The primary ground used to deny such liability 
is that a city generally owes no duty upon which, an individual plaintiff 
can base a recovery.11 These decisions establish that a municipality gener-
5 See, generally, 18 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §53.23 (1950); 
Borchard, "Government Liability in Tort," 34 YALE L. J. I, 129, 229 (1924); 36 YALE 
L. J. I, 757, 1039 (1927); 28 .CoL. L. REv. 577, 734 (1928); Smith, "Municipal Tort Liabil-
ity," 48 MICH. L. REV. 41 (1949). Florida has recently -by judicial decision discarded the 
traditional governmental-proprietary distinction and -held that its municipalities may 
be liable for negligent performance of governmental functions. Hargrove v. Town of 
Cocoa Beach, (Fla. 1957) 96 s. (2d) 130, notes, 71 HARV. L. REV. 744 (1958); 56 MICH. L. 
REv. 465 (1958). 
6 "It is fimnly established ,that municipal corporations are engaged in the performance 
of governmental functions, and hence are not liable for torts in the operation of a police 
department .... " RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW 780 (1957). 
1 "The failure to provide, or inadequacy of, police protection usually does not give 
rise to a cause of action in tort against a city .... " 18 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 
3d ed., p. 290 (1950). See, e.g., Brogan v. Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 208, 1?9 A. (2d) 671 (1943). 
In Florida, however, immunity might have been -no bar in the principal case. See 
·Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, note 5 supra. 
s Sec. 8, Court of .Claims Act, N .Y. Laws (1939) c. 860, §8. This statute was interpreted 
by the court of appeals as a waiver of municipal immunity in Bernardine v. City of New 
York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E. (2d) 604 (1945). The •background for this decision is discussed 
in Lloyd, "Municipal Tort Liability in New York, a Legislative Challenge," 23 N.Y. 
UNIV. L. Q. REv. 278 (1948). 
9 See, e.g., Lubelfeld v. City of New York, 4 N.Y. (2d) 455, 151 N.E. (2d) 862 (1958); 
O'Grady v. City of Fulton, 4 N.Y. (2d) 717, 148 N.E. (2d) 317 (1958); Flamer v. Yonkers, 
309 N.Y. 114, 127 N.E. (2d) 838 (1955). 
10 Antieau, "Statutory ~xpansion of Municipal Tort Liability," 4 ST. Lours UNIV. 
L. J. 351 (1957); Lloyd, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roil" 24 N.Y. UNIV. L. Q. REv. 38 
(1949). 
11 Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E. (2d) 704 (1945); Murrain v. Wilson 
Line, 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S. (2d) 750 (1946), affd. 296 N.Y. 845, 72 N.E. (2d) 29 
(1947); Scott v. City of New York, 2 App. Div. (2d) 854, 155 N.Y.S. (2d) 787 (1956), app. 
granted 3 N.Y. (2d) 930, 145 N.E. (2d) 888 (1957); King v. City of New York, 3 Misc. (2d) 
241, 152 N.Y.S. (2d) 110 (1956). Another possible ground for denying liability in the 
nonfeasance area, that the Court of Claims Act did not waive municipal immunity in 
regard to nonfeasance connected with governmental functions, was suggested in the 
Murrain case. This was made the .ground for decision in Landby v. New York, N.H. &: H. 
R.R. Co., 278 App. Div. 965, 105 N.Y.S. (2d) 839 (1951), motion for leave to appeal den. 
303 N.Y. 1014, 102 N.E. (2d) 840 (1951). The distinction was rejected in Runkel v. City 
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ally has no duty to act unless such duty is imposed by contract or statute,12 
and even where a mandatory duty is imposed by statute or city charter a 
plaintiff cannot recover for damages caused by a failure to perform the 
duty unless the statute was intended to benefit him as a particular indi-
vidual and not simply as a member of the general public.13 The theory of 
the action in the principal case, founded upon the city's negligent failure 
to provide police protection, is apparently based on nonfeasance.14 Does 
the principal case, in holding that the city may be liable for this omission, 
mark a fundamental departure from the prior decisions on nonfeasance 
of a governmental function? The majority opinion indicates it does not. 
The majority's decision rests on the narrow ground that the citizen's 
duty to supply information of known criminals to the police creates a re-
ciprocal duty to provide protection.15 This position seems questionable. 
While the common law made it a legal duty implemented by criminal sanc-
tions to inform in some situations,16 the common law is not incorporated 
into New York's criminal code.17 The modern device for obtaining infor-
mation is the reward, which in itself belies the idea of a legal duty to in-
form, for if there is such a duty the act of informing would probably not 
be sufficient consideration to make a promise of reward binding.18 It 
would seem, therefore, that when the courts speak of a duty to inform they 
are referring only to a moral duty. To argue that a moral duty begets a 
legal duty, as the majority in the principal case appears to argue,19 seems 
tenuous. The decision could have been placed on firmer grounds. The 
court could have relied on the provision of the New York City Charter 
giving the police department the duty of preventing crime and preserving 
the public peace.20 Past decisions had found such provisions no basis for 
actions against municipalities because they were intended to protect the 
injured party only as a member of the general public and not as a par-
ticular individual.21 These decisions could have been avoided, however, by 
of New York, 282 App. Div. 173, 123 N.Y.S. (2d) 485 (1953), which held the waiver 
absolute. The principal case is silent on the point, and in holding that the city can be 
held liable for its failure to provide protection, may be regarded as impliedly rejecting 
this basis of non-liability. 
12 See Steitz v. City of Beacon, note 11 supra. 
13 See note 11 supra. 
14 Judge McNally, concurring in the principal case at 541, took the view ·this was a 
tort of commission because there was some evidence the police supplied partial protection 
and then withdrew it. The opinion of the court does not take this position, however. 
15 Principal case at 538. 
16 Cl.ARK AND MARsHALL, CRIMES, 6th ed., 486 (1958). 
17 39 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944) §22. 
18 1 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT §76(a) (1932). And see I CORBIN, CONTRAcrs §70 (1950). 
19 "For present purposes it matters little whether this duty •be described as legal 
or moral." Principal case at 538. 
20 New York City Charter §435 (1936). 
21 Steitz v. City of Beacon, note 11 supra (charter gave city duty of fire protection); 
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adopting the analysis used in a dissenting opinion in the lower court,22 
that where a municipality reasonably should foresee that its failure to per-
form a statutory duty is likely to bring harm to a particular individual the 
municipality has a duty to act. Past decisions could have been distinguished 
by the lack of such foreseeability. That the court preferred a more dubious 
reciprocal duty analysis to this broader concept of foreseeability indicates 
that the court sought to establish a basis for liability without opening a 
major breach in the wall of municipal non-liability for nonfeasance in 
connection with governmental functions. By making the city's duty de-
pendent not on the foreseeability of danger to the decedent but on his 
status as an informer, the court limited the impact of the case to the in-
former situation.23 The decision, therefore, should not be regarded as a 
basic departure from precedent; it is rather a further attempt to delineate 
the area of "safe" municipal liability.24 
The court clearly felt the narrow informer situation was one which did 
not create much likelihood of overburdensome liability, though on this 
point a strong dissent was registered.25 The position of the dissent would 
be stronger if the duty now imposed is to protect all informers, rather than 
merely those requesting protection, as the majority suggests.26 Since the 
"professional" informer is in his own best interest not likely to request pro-
tection, there would be no duty to protect this large category of inform-
ers, and the burden does not appear overwhelming. Under such circum-
stances the result in the principal case seems justified. While the court is 
open to the criticism that it has invited uncertainty and exception-making 
by the lower courts, its temporary setting aside of the general rules of non-
liability where liability is felt "safe" and its willingness to be bound not 
by the letter of its rules but by their purpose is to its credit. To the argu-
ment that the court is not the body to determine which liability is "safe," 
the answer is that some such protection is needed and until the legislature 
draws the line only the courts are available to give it. 
Thomas E. Kauper, S.Ed. 
Murrain v. Wilson Line, note 11 supra (New York City Charter §435, 1936, held not 
intended to protect plaintiff individually). 
22 See the opinion of Judge Beldlock, dissenting below in the principal case, 286 
App. Div. 389 at 391 (1955). 
23 The informer category includes any persons who as a result of aiding in the 
arrest and prosecution of criminals need police .protection, since a similar reciprocal duty 
analysis could .be used. 
24 It should be ,borne in mind •that the principal case merely establishes a potential 
basis for tort liability against the city. It remains for determination whether any causal 
relation in fact can be shown •between the failure to give protection and decedent's 
slaying. See the dissenting opinion of Judge Froessel, principal case at 546. 
25 See the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Conway, principal case at 542, 545, 
expressing the fear that liability of this nature "will incapacitate the entire existing 
police force and leave the general public without police protection." 
26 Principal case at 537. 
